Author: Philippe van BASSHUYSEN
Abstract : It can be argued (cf. Dizadji‑Bahmani et al. 2010) that an increase in
coherence is one goal that drives reductionist enterprises. Consequently, the
question if or how well this goal is achieved can serve as an epistemic criterion
for evaluating both a concrete case of a purported reduction and our model of
reduction : what conditions on the model allow for an increase in coherence ?
In order to answer this question, I provide an analysis of the relation between
the reduction and the coherence of two theories. The underlying model of
reduction is a (generalised) Nagelian model (cf. Nagel 1970, Schaffner 1974,
Dizadji‑Bahmani et al. 2010). For coherence, different measures have been put
forward (e.g. Shogenji 1999, Olsson 2002, Fitelson 2003, Bovens & Hartmann
2003). However, since there are counterexamples to each proposed coherence
measure, we should be careful that the analysis be sufficiently stable (in a sense
to be specified). It will turn out that this can be done.
Keywords : Nagelian reduction, Coherence, Bayesian coherence measures,
Bayesian networks, Bayesian analysis
References
Bovens, Luc and Hartmann, Stephan. 2003. Bayesian epistemology. Oxford :
Clarendon Press.
Bovens, Luc and Hartmann, Stephan. NA. „Coherence, belief expansion and
Bayesian networks“. Unknown journal.
Bovens, Luc and Hartmann, Stephan. 2005. „Coherence and the Role of
Specificity : A Response to Meijs and Douven“. In Mind, Vol. 114.
Dizadji‑Bahmani, Foad, Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan. 2010. „Who
is afraid of Nagelian reduction ?“ In Erkenntnis 73, 393 ‑ 412.
Dizadji‑Bahmani, Foad, Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan. 2011.
„Confirmation and reduction : a Bayesian account“. In Synthese 179, 321
‑ 338.
Douven, Igor and Meijs, Wouter. 2005. „Bovens and Hartmann on Coherence“.
In Mind, New Series, Vol. 114, No. 454, 355 ‑ 363.
Fitelson, Branden. 1999. „The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation
and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity“. In Philosophy of Science 66,
Supplement Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy
of Science Association. Part I : Contributed Papers (Sep., 1999).
Fitelson, Branden. 2003. „A probabilistic theory of coherence“. In Analysis
63, 194 ‑ 199.
Hempel, Carl Gustav and Oppenheim, Paul. 1948. „Studies in the Logic of
Explanation“. In Philosophy of Science 15, No. 2 (Apr., 1948), 135 ‑ 175.
Jensen, Finn V. 2000. An introduction to Bayesian networks. London : UCL Press.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1977. „Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice“.
In : The Essential Tension : Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change ,
Chicago : Chicago University Press, 320 ‑ 329.
Nagel, Ernest. 1970. „Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations“. In Mind,
Science, and History, H.E. Kiefer & K.M. Munitz (eds.), Albany, NY : SUNY
Press, 117 – 137.
Neapolitan, Richard. 2003. Learning Bayesian networks. Prentice Hall Series in
Artificial Intelligence.
Olsson, Erik J. 2002. „What is the problem of coherence and truth ?“ In The
Journal of Philosophy 99, 246 ‑ 272.
Schaffner, Kenneth F. 1974. „Reductionism in Biology : Prospects and
Problems“. In PSA : Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of
Science Association 1974, 613 ‑ 632.
Shogenji, Tomoji. 1999. „Is coherence truth‑conducive ?“ In Analysis 59, 338
‑ 345.
Williamson, Jon. 2005. Bayesian Nets and Causality : Philosophical and
Computational Foundations. Oxford : Oxford University Press.